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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
H. A. :MENLOVE, for himself and
as · President of S A L T L A K E
COUNTY MOTEL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, through
its Commissioners, 'VILLIAl\1 G.
LARSON, MARVIN G. JENSON
and JOHN P. CREER; and UTAH
STATE TAX COMJ\1ISSION,
through its Commissioners, DONALD T. ADAl\iS, ORVILLE
GUNTHER, A. PRATT KESLER, and RANSO.M QUINN,
Defendants.

No.
10564

BRIEF OF RESPONDENf
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Salt Lake County, the respondent, seeks the affirmance of the judgment of the District Court and costs on
appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to the provisions of 17-31-1 through 1731-7 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Salt Lake County
passed, on July 27, 1965, an ordinance entitled the
"Transient Room Tax Ordinance" hereinafter referred
to as "Ordinance".
The provisions of the sections cited in the above paragraph authorized county commissions to establish and
promote recreational, tourist and convention promotion
bureaus financed by the imposition of a transient room
tax not to exceed "one and one-half per cent of the rent
for every occupancy of a suite, room or rooms." Subject to assessment were all "persons, companies, corporations, or other like and similar persons, groups or organizations doing business as motor courts, motels,
hotels, inns or like and similar public accommodations."
(Emphasis added.)
The "Ordinance" provided for State Tax Com·
mission assumption of administrative and collection
responsibilities according to the provisions of Chapter
9, Title 11, U.C.A. 1953, relating to sales and use taxes.
On August 2, 1965, appellants filed an action in
Third District Court seeking to restrain enforcement
of the "Ordinance" pending a ruling on its constitu·
tionality. Respondents made a motion for a dismissal
which was argued and denied without prejudice, filed
an answer, and, subsequently, moved for a summary
judgment asserting the absence of any material ques·
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tion of fact and alleging all controverted matters to
he matters of law. The motion for summary judg-

ment having been argued and Salt Lake County having
~ubmitted a brief in support of its contentions, judgment was granted by Judge Stewart M. Hanson in
a memorandum decision dated January 18, 1966.
From this decision, appellants appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT
~RR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
I.

II. ALL SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS IN
CONTROVERSY HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY
DECIDED BY THIS AND OTHER COURTS
IN RESPONDENTS' FAVOR.

Ill. APPELLANT LACKS STANDING
TO RAISE TIIE ISSUES URGED ON APPEAL.

ARGUMENT
NO. I. THE LO\VER COURT DID NOT
ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' .MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In Howe vs. State Tax Commission, 10 U. 2d 362,
3G3, P.2d 468, and cases there cited, this Court accepted
3

as a guiding principle when legislation was attacked
on constitutional grounds, the proposition that all
doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality.
Appellant argues that the District Court in granting a summary judgment for Salt Lake County, deprived him of the "right to offer evidence in support
of the allegations in his pleadings". Appellant's
Brief, p. 12). It is apparent that the matters in issue
were heard by the Court at the time of the Motion to
Dismiss and, subsequently, upon the hearing of respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.Appellant's
contention, if permitted literal application, would subject the Lower Court to the onerous task of hearing
evidence on every matter, however questionable, when
pleadings call the constitutionality of legislation in
question.
The mere allegation of the constitutional infirmity
of legislation is not enough to require the Court to hear
more detailed evidence than was offered in this matter.
A constitutional question does not arise merely because
it is raised and a decision is sought. Murie vs. Cavalier
County, 68 ND 242, 278 NW 243.
The Howe case (supra) presented this Court alle·
gations of error similar to those raised by appellant
under appellant's Point Number Three. In "Howe,"
the Lower Court, after hearing arguments and per·
mitting the submission of brief, granted the State Tax
Commission's motion for a dismissal on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
4'

eould be granted. The allegation was made on appeal
that such action deprived appellant of a right to be
heard. This Court, disregarding the allegation of error,
found for the Tax Commission, affirming the summary
procedure of the District Court.
NO. II. ALL SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS IN
CONTROVERSY HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY
DECIDED BY THIS AND OTHER COURTS
IN RESPONDENT'S' FAVOR.
Appellant's brief disinters arguments similar to
those heard by this Court and laid to rest in the matter
of Howe vs. State Tax Commission, IO Ut. 2d 362,
353 P 2d 468, in which case counsel for the present
appellant, Mr. Maw, represented the Utah State Motel
Association.
Appellants argue that the classification for taxation of "transients", defined by the "Ordinance" as
"any person who occupies any suite, room or rooms
in a motel, hotel, motor court, inn or similar public
accommodation for fewer than thirty consecutive days"
is "discriminatory, unreasonable and unrealistic" since
it requires taxation of some and exempts from taxation
other parties of the same class. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 8). In the "Howe" case the argument was that
the ordinance did not specifically mention apartments,
rooming houses, and private residences, and, hence,
since the other short period rentals were specifically
covered, did not apply equally to all those within the
same class. The similarity in approach of the two arguments is readily apparent.
5

The Lower Court in its Memorandum Decision
specifically mentioned the "Howe" case, and no doubt
concluded that the classification was reasonable based
upon the following language in that case:
"The legislative purpose appears to have been to
impose a tax on charges made for lodgings of the short
period or stopover type traditionally provided by inns
or hotels, as distinguished from lodgings for longer
periods, which assume the character of residence. The
thirty-day limitation in our statute seems to be a reasonable time break off point for classification of the two
classes of tenants." (Emphasis added).
In Gauldin VlJ. Kirk, (Fla.) 47 So.2d 567, the
reasonableness of the classification between transients
and permanent guests or tenants is discussed at length.
Transients were, in the Florida legislation, acknowledged to be parties remaining in premises for less than
six months. The Florida Supreme Court held: "The
six months' basis of differentiation is reasonable and
does not amount to unjust or arbitrary discrimination."
Appellants have cited no authority which would
suggest that legislation has been held unconstitutional
by reason of the clasification between transients and
and others although at the time the "Howe" case was
argued at least eight states (Respondents' Brief, Howe
vs. State Tax Commission, 9201, P. 8) had legislation
similar to that of the "Transient Room Tax Ordi·
nance." The Florida and Arizona legislation has
survived constitutional challenges. See: White vs.
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Moore, 46 Ariz 48, P 2d 1077; Gauldin vs. Kirk!(Fla)
47 So.2d 567.
Appellant argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because some transients may stay in Salt Lake
County more than thirty days but change accommodations several times while others may stay in one place.
In this event, it is asserted, some members of the same
class could conceivably be taxed while others similarly
situated would be exempt. The argument runs that
this would constitute discrimination invalidating the
legislation on constitutional grounds.
It is hard to imagine a law so neatly drafted as
not to permit speculation as to its undesirable theoretical consequences given a certain set of facts. One
cannot, however, in order to defeat a law, invoke an
apprehension of what might be done under it. Lehan
vs. Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53, 61 L.ed. 145, 37 S. Ct. 70.
The power of courts to pass upon the constitutionality
of statutes arises only when the interests of litigants
require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference; a hypothetical
threat is not enough. United Public Workers vs. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 91 L.Ed 754, 67 S. Ct. 556. One can
not assert theoretical inequalities in a statute when he
is not affected by the discrimination which he alleges
exists. Begay vs. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P. 2d 624.
Appellants contend that the "Ordinance", since it
purports to tax the occupants and not the owners of
accommodations, is a constitutionally prohibited "classi7

fication of persons" for taxation purposes and not a
classification of property.
It is interesting to note that the brief in the "Howe"
case discussed the nature of the type of tax here imposed
in different terms. (Appellant's Brief, Howe vs. Tax
Commission, 9201, pages II and 12) White vs. Moore,
46 Ariz. 48, 46 P.2d 1077, is there cited as being an
example of a case where a state Supreme Court "passed
upon the constitutionality of sales tax laws on rentals".
The holding is recited in the brief as fallows:
"It must be kept in mind that a privilege tax
is not a tax on property but a tax on the right
to enyage in business and that the legislature
may impose it on any class or classes of business
it cares to and decline to apply it to others, its
only limitation in this respect being that the
classification it makes must be reasonable not
arbitrary or discriminating and such that all '
those falling within the same class will be treated
alike." (Emphasis added) .

The Utah State .Motel Association and the present
appellant's counsel were of the opinion on that occasion
that the above recital was a "correct statement of law".
Whether the tax is characterized as a simple tax
upon the occupancy of short term rental premises or
a so-called privilege tax on the right to engage in busi- ,
ness which is paid by the occupant, a notion given some
credence by the wording of the "Ordinance" itself, it
seems inappropriately characterized as a constitutionally
invalid tax on individuals.
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The arguments raised on appeal are in effect a
rehash of those raised against the original imposition
uf the sales tax on short term rental properties and
refiect a wishful sentimentality on the part of appellants that the entire matter be re-considered. Logically,
most if not all of the arguments advanced are equally
applicable to the entire sales tax on short term rentals
and not merely to the one and one-half per cent assessment provided for by the present "Ordinance". It is
respondent's contention that the matter was satisfactorily resolved by a unanimous Supreme Court in the
''1/ owe" case; that appellants' arguments are mere variati(ms of those previously advanced, the appeal presenting substantially identical parties and issues.
NO. Ill. APPELLANT LACKS STANDING
TO RAISE THE ISSUES URGED ON APPEAL.
l\!Ienlove, the motel operator, brought this action
"for himself and as President of Salt Lake County
Motel Association."
The "Transient Room Tax Ordinance" imposes a
tax upon "occupancy" of a suite, room or rooms. That
the tax is assessed upon the occupant and not the landlord is further indicated by section 4, which provides,
in part: '"There shall be excluded from the rent paid
or charged by which the tax is measured: ... " (Emphasis added) .
Appellants cannot question the constitutionality
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of the ordinance on the ground that it "imposes a tax
on a minority of individuals" (Complaint, paragraph
4) labelled "transients" (Appellants' Brief, p. 8) or
because it taxes a "class of people who receive no benefit therefrom" (i.e. "transient guests" - Appellants'
Brief, P. 11) because appellants are not members of
the "minority" allegedly injured. Appellants are operators and not occupants.
A person seeking to raise the question of the validity of a discriminatory statute has no standing for that
purpose unless he belongs to the class which is prejudiced by the statute. See: State vs. Candland, 36 Ut
406. 104 P. 285; Garieb vs. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 71 L
ed 1228, 47 S. Ct 675; Barrows vs. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249, 97 L ed 1586, 73 S. Ct 1031.
That the ordinance imposes upon appellants the
"expense of collecting and maintaining records and
accounting for the tax revenues" (Complaint, paragraph 5) does not give appellants standing to attack
the ordinance as unconstitutional. To have such standing, a taxpayer must show that he will sustain some
direct injury. Doremus vs. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 429, 96 L ed 475, 72 S. Ct 394. Such a challenge
cannot be made on the ground that the rights of others
will be impaired. See: Tileston vs. Ullman, 318 U.S.
44, 87 L ed 603; Walgreen Co. vs. State Board of
Equalization, 70 Wyo 193, 246 P 2d 767.
The tax imposed by the ordinance is collected and
accounted for and recor<ls are kept in conjunction with
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the same records which plaintiffs now are keeping pursuant to both the State and local sales and use tax laws.
The ordinance merely increases the percentage for
which plaintiffs must collect and account from 3.5 per
cent to 5 per cent. If appellants are to achieve standing
on the basis of this argument they must convince the
Court that it is more difficult to multiply by 5 than it
is to multiply by 3.5 and that this difficulty imposes a
substantial burden upon them.
It is clear that appellant has no standing in his
representative capacity as President of the Motel Association since an unincorporated association has no
standing to maintain an action in the name of the association. See: American Newspaper Guild vs. Macli·in non, et al., 108 F. Supp. 312, Utah District Court;
see also Northwestern Pennsylvania Automatic Phonograph Association vs. Meadville City, 359 Pa. 549, 50
A 2d 907; Georgia Music Operators Association vs.
Atlanta, 183 Ga 794, 190 S.E. 32 and 2 A.L.R. 917.
It has not been contended by Menlove, that he,
personally, stands to be injured in any way other than
as the owner of short term rental premises. There is
likewise no contention that he, in any capacity, ever
made payment under protest, or for that matter, was,
ever in fact, personally assessed or threatened with
assessment under the provisions of the new ordinance.

Respondent contends that, under such circumstauees, :Menlove does not qualify to contest the ordinance on grounds that he, himself, might perhaps be,
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under some stretch of the imagination, assessed under
its provisions. Authority exists for the proposition that
a taxpayer suit to restrain unconstitutional acts is available only to a party able to show that he has sustaine<l
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury, arising as the result of the enforcement of
the challenged statute, from a violation of a legal right,
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way,
in common with people generally. Doremus vs. Board
of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 96 Led 475, 72 S. Ct 394.
In addition, it is to be noted that, if appellant
had sought standing as a so-called "transient" rather
thau as a motel owner, he must then have complied
'vith the provisions of 59-11-11 and 59-15-12 U.C.A.
1953, which provide the exclusive remedy for anyone
genuinely interested in challenging the validity of taxes
imposed within the State of Utah. See also: Shea vs.
State Tax Commission, 101 U. 209, 120 P 2d 274 and
P.I.E. vs. State Tax Commission, 7 U. 2d 15, 316 P 2d
549.
CONCLUSION
The Lower Court's decision should be affirmed
and respondents should be awarded costs.
Respectfully submitted,
JOEL M. ALLRED
Attorney for Respondents
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